Editorial

Momentum mounts for US exit from Afghanistan, but what will fill the void?

One year from now, if all goes according to President Barack Obama's declared plan of action, the US will start its military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Whether this ends up as a complete withdrawal from that troubled country, or whether the US takes its cue from the Iraq experience and retains key bases, remains to be seen. The momentum to get out shows no sign of faltering.

No amount of verbal massaging by America's military chiefs and others, who insist that Washington is talking about the process of withdrawal rather than withdrawal itself, can disguise the deep unease in all Western capitals, where the Afghan war is now seen as a bottomless pit in which outsiders are easily trapped and then consumed.

It is worth recalling the circumstances in which the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was first deployed in Afghanistan to take on the Taliban and their al-Qaeda guests held responsible for the September 11 attacks on the US. Whether the US was justified in attacking a sovereign country and then toppling a government that gave refuge to al-Qaeda is a moot point.  But, having made that decision, the Americans and their allies then had to formulate a strategy of how and where to deploy their forces.

To start with the military campaign was swift and successful. The Taliban were not universally popular in their own country where their medieval, some say barbaric, outlook on women and non-Islamic traditions alienated at least half the country. As Mullah Omar and his entourage fled Kabul, many Afghans were only too pleased to see them go.

But ISAF's early success was not followed up. Inadequate political and military planning, hubris and a fatal lack of resources for the troops on the ground have all paved the way for impending collapse of the coalition force, the exit of the Americans and the return of the Taliban.

US political and military leaders are now all too ready to blame their plight on Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who rode to office on the back of an American tank.

But while Karzai is an easy target, not least because his government is made up of so many corrupt and incompetent officials unwilling to go the extra mile to build up a strong, democratic and tolerant alternative to the Taliban form of government, it is easy to forget that Karzai was never given all the support he needed.
This was never just a question of pouring endless amounts of cash into the hands of the post-Taliban administration in Kabul. This was also an issue of listening to the likes of Karzai and other moderate Afghan leaders who argued that no lasting victory over the Taliban was possible unless the US also addressed the issue of their safe havens across the border in Pakistan.

True, the Americans subsequently authorised the use of drones to attack some of the safe havens across the border. But analysts would argue that these drone attacks have never amounted to anything more than pinpricks. For understandable reasons the US has been reluctant to authorise any more substantive action that would take on a nuclear armed Pakistan.

As for the Pakistanis, their calculation from the start has been that the Americans and their allies lacked the stamina for a long-drawn war. Faced with Taliban suicide attacks, burgeoning financial costs and a local population that sees ISAF as an occupying rather than a liberating force, it was only a matter of time before the Americans settled for retreat.

For the adjoining countries of South and Central Asia there is now a compelling need to consider likely developments in the wake of an American withdrawal. Whether the Taliban return to power in Kabul is only one side of the story.

The larger picture demands answers to what kinds of forces and conflicts will be attracted to fill the political vacuum in the wake of an American exit. Would a Taliban dominated or influenced government of the future encourage all the mad mullahs of the region to establish themselves in Kabul before expanding their activities elsewhere? And if US reports are to be believed that Afghanistan sits on a trillion dollars worth of valuable minerals, does this not mean that yet more adventurers and mercenary armies are likely to be drawn to the country in future years?

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