June 2010
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June 2010

Rift in jihad

Militants now train guns on ISI

Pakistan intelligence agency holds no sway over new generation jihadists linked to transitional groups like al-Qaeda.

By Rahimullah Yusufzai
DESTINY UNKNOWN: The fate of the two kidnapped men still hangs in the balance

The fate of former official of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Colonel (Ret'd) Sultan Amir Tarar, commonly known as Colonel Imam, and British journalist Asad Qureshi, is hanging in the balance more than two months after their kidnapping by a previously unknown militant group calling itself the Asian Tigers.

A third colleague, Squadron Leader (Ret'd) Khalid Khwaja, also a former ISI official, was executed by the kidnappers on April 10 at the end of a 10-day deadline after the refusal of the Pakistan government to accept their demands. The Asian Tigers were demanding the release of three important Afghan Taliban commanders and 160 Pakistani militants in custody of the government. In the case of journalist and documentary maker Qureshi, who is of Pakistani origin, the group have demanded $10 million as ransom for his release.

The Pakistan government is unlikely to release the militants demanded by the Asian Tigers as many among them are dangerous and some have been convicted by the courts.

 
 

Also, retired soldiers — even if they are former ISI officials — have much less value than serving military officers and, therefore, the military and the government aren't under any pressure to make a deal with the kidnappers to secure the release of the kidnapped men. Qureshi's employers and the British government have made no effort to seek his release, while his family cannot pay the huge ransom that is being demanded. Meanwhile, the Asian Tiger organization has been getting impatient and threatening to kill the two men if its demands are not met.

The two well-known former ISI men and the British journalist went missing in North Waziristan, bordering Afghanistan, on March 26. They were visiting the dangerous tribal region to make a documentary on the Taliban and also the US drone strikes that have killed a number of foreign and Pakistani militants and a lot more civilians in North Waziristan, and unnerved the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership.

The Asian Tiger organization kept the kidnapping secret for days before claiming it was holding the three men and issuing a video-tape containing their images, and statements to prove its claim. It offered to release them in exchange for three important Afghan Taliban figures — Mulla Abdul Ghani Biradar, Mulla Abdul Kabir and Mansoor Dadullah — presently 'in the custody of the Pakistan government'. The group didn't even know that Kabir wasn't, in fact, in detention in Pakistan.

The kidnapping showed the generational change among militants and the changing shape of the relationship between the ISI, which is Pakistan's leading intelligence agency, and the militants. The new generation of militants is more independent and is pursuing its radical goals. The ISI is no longer able to control the various militants' groups, which in the past had cordial ties to the Pakistani military. The splintered militants now have links to transnational groups such as al-Qaeda. These groups are angry with the Pakistan military and government for aligning with the US and NATO in the 'war on terror'. They would do anything to embarrass the Pakistan government and force it to accept their demands. One of their major tactics is to kidnap people close to Islamabad and the Pakistani military, including serving and retired officers, and use them as bargaining chips.

The Asian Tigers is apparently the front organization for an anti-Shia faction of Pakistani militants linked earlier to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It is also referred to sometimes as a group of Punjabi Taliban operating out of North Waziristan in close cooperation with tribal militants and aligned to the outlawed Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led earlier by Baitullah Mahsud and, after his death, by Hakimullah Mahsud.

The apparent motive for the Asian Tigers to kidnap Khwaja, Col Imam and Qureshi, and to later execute Khwaja, was its anger against the latter for bringing a list of 14 senior Pakistani Taliban commanders, mostly Punjabis associated with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, during his previous visit to North Waziristan some months ago and advising top TTP leaders Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rahman to get rid of them as they were on the payroll of the Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). If true, this must have annoyed Hakimullah Mehsud because the list contained the name of Qari Hussain Mahsud, who happens to be his cousin and top commander and is known as the master trainer of suicide bombers. Others in the list, such as Qari Zafar, were also considered close to the TTP leadership. Zafar carried head-money of $5 million after being accused of masterminding the February 2006 attack on the US Consulate in Karachi, in which American diplomat David Foy was killed. Qari Zafar, seen sitting with Hakimullah Mehsud in a video-taped press conference in South Waziristan in October 2009, was reportedly killed later in a US drone strike.

There were also other allegations against Khwaja. The Asian Tigers accused him of betraying the two Red Mosque clerics-brothers in their showdown with the Pakistan Army in the heart of Islamabad in 2007 and trapping one of them, Maulana Abdul Aziz, into escaping wearing a woman's veil from the besieged mosque and then getting him arrested. This allegation was proved wrong as Maulana Aziz quickly issued a denial and then led the funeral prayers for Khwaja when his body was brought to Islamabad for burial. The Asian Tigers spokesman Mohammad Omar termed Khwaja an agent of the ISI and CIA and complained that he opposed the Pakistani Taliban, describing them as terrorists while praising the Afghan Taliban as 'mujahideen' (holy warriors).  Omar also alleged that Khwaja and Col Imam were visiting North Waziristan on the advice of former Pakistan Army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg, former ISI head Lt Gen (Ret'd) Hamid Gul and a serving ISI official Col Sajjad.

There is no doubt that Khwaja was forced under duress to make sweeping statements in the video-tape. He confessed to being an ISI and CIA agent and accepted his guilt for luring the Lal Masjid cleric Maulana Aziz to escape from the besieged mosque wearing a veil and then getting him arrested. He was prompted to say that certain jihadi commanders such as Fazlur Rahman Khalil, Masood Azhar and Abdullah Shah Mazhar, and militant organisations including Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jamiatul Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al Badr, were still operating as ISI's proxies and were allowed to collect funds in Pakistan.

This clearly reflected the rift between the jehadi groups. One the one hand, there were groups allegedly still maintaining contacts with the ISI. On the other, the militant groups angry with the military and the ISI were now trying to settle scores with it by using the kidnapped Khwaja to say nasty things in the video against the ISI. It was obvious that the militants' groups had suffered splits and were now operating out of rival camps with conflicting agendas.

The demands made by the Asian Tigers for the release of Khwaja, Col Imam and Qureshi also came as a surprise. It is supposed to be a Pakistani militant group but it initially wanted the release of three Afghan Taliban commanders, Biradar, Kabir and Mansoor Dadullah — apparently to win favour with the Mulla Omar-led Afghan Taliban and prove its credentials as a true jehadi organization. Then it changed its tune and demanded freedom for 160 Pakistani militants and also payment of $10 million as ransom. 

This incident has highlighted the complexity of the North Waziristan situation. And this is the place where the US wants the Pakistani military to undertake a major military operation against the militants of every creed and persuasion now based there. The Punjabi Taliban and other groups are able to operate there with help from local militants. They are reportedly concentrated in the Mir Ali area, where Mahsud Taliban from South Waziristan also found refuge after fleeing the military operation in their own areas. Also documented in North Waziristan is the presence of Uzbek militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other foreigners, including some Arabs linked to al-Qaeda. The Haqqani Network of the Afghan Taliban under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani also maintains a presence in North Waziristan .

Hafiz Gul Bahadur, leader of the Taliban in North Waziristan, is the strongest militant commander in this tribal region. He isn't part of the TTP, but the two groups have avoided confrontation despite occasional rifts with each other and are even known to cooperate when facing a common enemy. However, the provocative activities of the Punjabi Taliban such as the Asian Tigers group and the Mahsud Taliban in North Waziristan seem to have angered him and his men. He wants the outside militants to get out of North Waziristan as their presence could force the Pakistani military to take action. It seems he is unable to expel the outsiders who are threatening the fragile peace in North Waziristan. Recently, he and his shura (council) publicly criticized the outsiders misusing the name of Taliban and made it clear that their peace accord with the Pakistan government was intact. However, this controversial peace deal is under threat and could fall apart under American pressure and due to the provocative actions of militants such as the Asian Tigers and the TTP.

Lately, there have been reports that, following talks, the Mehsud Taliban and their jehadi allies have agreed to leave North Waziristan and return to South Waziristan or other tribal regions. This could delay any Pakistani military offensive against the militants in North Waziristan and test the patience of the US, which is demanding tough action in this tribal region to tackle the Haqqani Network, the al-Qaeda militants and other enemies of the US-led Nato forces.

There was a sense of urgency after Khwaja's killing to save the lives of the remaining two hostages, particularly Col Imam. Former Afghan mujahideen and Taliban commanders who knew him, leaders of Pakistan's religious parties and serving and retired Pakistan Army and ISI officials all became active and contacted militants and tribal elders in North Waziristan and elsewhere to help in his recovery. The Haqqani Network also expedited its efforts to negotiate with the Asian Tigers for Col Imam's release as the former ISI official had once been close to the elderly Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, an Afghan mujahideen commander and father of Sirajuddin Haqqani. There were reports that the government too was making efforts through tribal elders to win freedom for the two men. However, there has been no breakthrough in these efforts and the families of the kidnapped men and their well-wishers are beginning to complain that the government is doing little to seek their release.

The kidnapping case is still unresolved and the fate of the two hostages is uncertain. Talks have been held with the Asian Tigers but there has been a stalemate due to the rigid attitude of the kidnappers. If the Pakistan government continues to refuse the kidnappers' demands, there is fear that the hostages could be harmed. In that case, the animosity between the category of militants represented by the Asian Tigers and its TTP allies and the Pakistan military would intensify. This new breed of militants is no longer under the ISI's control and has developed strong links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Through their reckless actions, these militants have been forcing the hand of Pakistan's security forces to initiate military action against them in one tribal area after another. The result has been a widening conflict in northern Pakistan

 

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